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Abstract 
The long-standing debate on environmental policy ‘leaders’ and ‘laggards’ lends itself to a new 
analysis following with the advent of the 2008 economic crisis. This paper, therefore, asks the 
question to what extent do European Union (EU) member states have the capacity and willingness 
to implement EU environmental policy amid austerity, budget cuts, and rising costs over the period 
2008-2014. Building upon previous studies, 26 interviews with European, Greek and United 
Kingdom participants and records of environmental infringements, the paper provides a 
contemporary picture of the environmental policy ‘leader-laggard’ dynamic in Europe. The 
findings demonstrate that the impact of the economic crisis seems contestable and varies amongst 
member states, while the reduction in environmental infringements appears to have a link with the 
decrease in economic activity. Although environmental policy ‘leaders’ maintain patterns of strong 
implementation, the improved implementation performance of some ‘laggards’ reflects a shift in 
their implementation patterns amid a period of intense political and economic controversies.  
Key words: Economic crisis; EU environmental policy; leaders and laggards; implementation 
performance; policy outputs and outcomes  
 
1. Introduction 
Since the 2008 economic crisis, the European Union (EU) and its member states have faced 
pressure to relax environmental requirements and weaken environmental legislation (Gravey and 
Jordan, 2016; Burns et al., 2018; Knill et al., 2018; Pollex and Lenschow, 2019). As Steinebach 
and Knill (2017:430) argue ‘in the aftermath of the financial and economic crisis, […] recent years 
have witnessed increasing political demands for slowing down, halting or even reversing the 
expansion of EU’s regulatory scope’. In some member states, environmental policy has been 
portrayed as costly thus impeding a fast-economic recovery (ENDS Report, July 2012). Moreover, 
austerity and resulting budget cuts in some member states (especially in Southern Europe) have 
raised doubts over their capacity and political will to implement EU environmental policy 
efficiently (Burns et al., 2019). The successful implementation of environmental policy, as 
suggested by existing studies, hinges on the institutional and administrative capacity of a given 
state alongside the presence or absence of strong policy structures and political leadership. Such 
capacity is argued to exist only in a small number of member states such as the Nordic countries, 
Germany, Austria, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (UK) (Knill et al., 2012).  
In this paper, we aim to explore whether and how the fallout from the 2008 economic crisis has 
impacted on the capacity and willingness of members states to implement EU environmental 
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policy, and, in doing so, consider academic debates on the EU member state environmental policy 
'leader-laggard’ dynamic. By developing and mapping out the broader implementation patterns of 
EU member states, we seek to analyze the environmental policy implementation and the ‘leader-
laggard’ dynamic in relation to policy outputs and outcomes (Burns and Tobin, 2016). Central to 
this analysis is the ‘goodness of fit’ hypothesis which focuses on the compatibility of EU policy 
and the policy and institutional configurations of member states (Börzel and Risse, 2003), with an 
initial focus on all member states and more detailed insights from Greek and United Kingdom 
perspectives. The specific focus of these two member states is based on wanting to understand 
some of the drivers behind different implementation patterns – in these two cases our initial 
analysis, outlined below, showed that Greece’s implementation record plateaued while the UK’s 
improved. The analysis of environmental policy in general for this research, rather than individual 
policy case studies, rests on the fact that the success or failure of individual policies or the means 
for achieving policy goals do not provide insights into the wider administrative and social trends 
impacting environmental policy implementation. To date, various directives such as the Water 
Framework Directive have been applied and produced different outcomes by EU member states 
(EEA, 2015). For example, some studies (Liefferink et al., 2009; Knill et al., 2012) have shown 
that the performance of a ‘leader’ or ‘laggard’ varies across a number of policy fields at given 
points in time. The study of the economic crisis in relation to environmental policy implementation 
provides an interesting frame in which to explore the ‘leader-laggard’ dynamic for two reasons. 
First, it contributes to a finer grained and updated understanding of the environmental policy 
‘leader-laggard’ dynamic in times of crisis. Second, it reassesses the classifications of ‘leaders’ 
and ‘laggards’ based on their policy outputs and outcomes.  
The structure of this paper is as follows. First, we set the scene of the ‘leader-laggard’ debate and 
then provide the definitions of implementation. Second, we outline the conceptual framing of the 
paper through drawing on a ‘top-down’ model of implementation in the context of ‘downloading’ 
EU environmental policies by member states alongside the ‘goodness of fit’ approach as described 
above. Third, we empirically explore environmental policy outcomes at the EU level in the context 
of the economic crisis. Fourth, we compare the policy outcomes at the EU level with the policy 
outcomes at the level of EU member states. Finally, we discuss the implications of these results in 
light of our conceptual framework and conclude the paper by stating that overall there has been an 
improvement in the implementation of EU environmental policy by EU member states. This 
improvement is reflected in the decrease of environmental infringements which according to some 
participants relates to a lower economic output after 2008. Furthermore, ‘leaders’ turn out to 
perform better than ‘laggards’. However, policy ‘misfits’ still remain, with the economic crisis 
possibly creating new ones, as austerity cuts into the size and budgets of member state national 
and regional administrations.  
 
2. Conceptually understanding the ‘leader-laggard’ dynamic in the EU 
2.1. ’Leader-Laggard’ Debate 
Research on ‘leaders’ and ‘laggards’ dates back to the dawn of EU environmental policy in the 
early 1970s when explanations were sought for how, when, why and under what conditions 
countries implement environmental policy (Andersen and Liefferink, 1997). Since then, a broad 
and blossoming literature (e.g. Rehbinder and Stewart, 1985; Pridham, 1994; Jänicke, 2005; 
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Liefferink et al., 2009; Knill et al., 2012; Börzel, 2017) has emerged. The main scope of this 
literature was an assessment of variations in the development of environmental policy, the speed 
of adoption of policies, the regulatory tools and strictness, and policy achievements such as 
environmental quality at the international level over time (Knill et al., 2012:36). These variations 
in policy performance have been attributed to an array of socio-political and economic factors 
pertinent to states and multi-level governance systems, such as (non) compliance and 
implementation deficits. Rapid change in environmental policy performance may also be 
dependent on domestic political and economic conditions (i.e. a change in government) or external 
pressures (i.e. an economic shock or crises) (Börzel, 2002).  
Reference to ‘leaders’ or ‘laggards’ in EU environmental policy includes evaluations of both 
individual and groups of countries. The definition provided by Liefferink and Wurzel, (2017:956) 
will be used here to characterize ‘leaders’, ‘a state may qualify as environmental ‘leader’ or 
‘pioneer’ either by being the first to propagate or introduce a certain environmental policy 
innovation or by exhibiting the highest level of ambition (e.g. strictest standard)’. According to 
the literature (Liefferink and Wurzel, 2017), member states in this category include Austria, 
Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom1. On the other 
hand, according to Knill et al., (2012:38) a ‘laggard’ state is ‘reluctant and often resistant to the 
adoption of comprehensive and stringent environmental regulations. This characteristic means 
that a ‘laggard’ state introduces (certain) policies comparatively late or not at all’. Member states 
often regarded as ‘laggards’ in the literature (Börzel, 2000; Liefferink et al., 2009) include Greece, 
Ireland, Portugal, Spain and most of the Eastern Central European states. Finally, states ‘in the 
middle’ (Andersen and Liefferink, 1997), ‘in-betweeners’ (Knill et al., 2012) or ‘fence-sitters’ as 
claimed by Börzel (2002:206) ‘neither set the pace nor put the brake on EU policies. Rather, they 
tend to take an indifferent and neutral position, or they build changing coalitions with pace-setters 
and footdraggers, depending on the issue involved’. Hence, we assert that being an ‘in-betweener’ 
presupposes fewer costs in policy implementation due to the already existing structures but limited 
willingness to fully engage with EU policy prescriptions. Countries such as Belgium, France, 
Luxembourg, Italy and the United Kingdom are routinely argued to belong in this group (Andersen 
and Liefferink 1997; Knill et al., 2012). 
 
The existing literature draws on different explanatory approaches for (non) compliance and 
implementation deficits. The first approach centers on the administrative lethargy, institutional 
incapacity and legislative inefficiency of Southern states (Pridham, 1994; Pridham and Cini, 1994). 
This explanation implies a systemic weakness in terms of agreeing and proceeding with reforms 
due to the fragmentation of political system, the strong presence of red tape and the lack of 
coordination between the different government entities which can cause significant delays in 
transposition and policy implementation. The second approach concerns adaptation pressures 
surrounding the degree of ‘fit’ or ‘misfit’ between EU regulations and domestic regulatory and 
institutional frameworks (Börzel and Risse 2000; Cowles et al., 2001; Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002; 
Falkner et al., 2008). In a sense, the extent of domestic change relies on the compatibility of policy 
structures, institutions and infrastructure. The stronger the ‘fit’, the better the implementation. The 
third approach refers to the action and mobilization of domestic actors who apply high levels of 
 
1 The UK in many studies is regarded both leader and in-betweener interchangeably. 
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political pressure on effective policy implementation (Tsebelis, 2002; Börzel, 2003). Their role is 
deemed crucial in providing knowledge and pushing national governments to comply with EU 
requirements in order to achieve timely and correct policy implementation. Weak domestic 
mobilization and a lack of consensus among social actors in Southern Europe can influence the 
decision-making and hamper policy implementation (Börzel, 2003; Koutalakis, 2004).  
Being a ‘leader’ or ‘laggard’ has been characterized as a stable characteristic or static condition in 
some of the existing literature (e.g. La Spina and Sciortino, 1993; Pridham, 1994), but recent 
studies have sought to challenge this argument (Liefferink and Wurzel, 2017). For example, they 
have shown that the performance of a ‘leader’ or ‘laggard’ varies across a number of policy fields, 
at given points in time (i.e. it is a dynamic process). A case in point is Austria, in that its strong 
climate change ambitions do not match its weaker policy outcomes despite its reputation as an 
environmental policy leader (Tobin, 2017). In a similar vein, the Netherlands no longer seems to 
be in the driving seat pushing forward climate legislation and instead relinquishing its leadership 
role to pursue the so called ‘cost-free leadership’ (Liefferink and Wurzel, 2017: 955).  
 
2.2. Defining Implementation 
Given the abundance of definitions of implementation in the existing literature (Dimitrakopoulos 
and Richardson, 2001; Pülzl and Treib, 2007; Hupe, 2014), we will define it as the process of 
transposing and applying EU policies to the domestic level by the national authorities. A number 
of scholars have addressed implementation by breaking it down into two strands (Skjærseth and 
Wettestad, 2002; Liefferink et al., 2009; Newig and Fritz, 2009; Holzinger et al., 2011; Knill et 
al., 2012; Bondarouk and Mastenbroek, 2017). The first strand explains policy outputs as the 
actions taken, and instruments and tools developed for the delivery of policy. The second strand 
focuses on policy outcomes, that is, the results or effects caused by the policy outputs. Despite the 
fact that a number of studies have sought to classify states according to their environmental policy 
record, only a few have attempted to analyze this pattern in terms of policy outcomes (e.g. 
Liefferink et al., 2009; Knill et al., 2012; Tobin, 2017). We seek to build on this literature by also 
exploring the ‘leader-laggard’ dynamic through EU member state policy outcomes. 
 
 
2.3. ‘Top-Down’ Implementation and the ‘Goodness of Fit’  
‘Leaders’ and ‘laggards’ can interact within a two-way relationship through bargaining and 
building country coalitions around common goals, interests and ambitions so as to promote their 
positions to the EU. This relationship can be ‘bottom-up’ where leading member states pursue to 
influence EU environmental policy to achieve a more level playing field by seeking higher (or 
lower) policy standards in line with their own domestic policy. At the national level, domestic 
actors pressurize their governments to push for policies at the supranational level that are favorable 
to their interests. At the EU level, member states seek to promote policies that fit into the domestic 
pressures and reduce the implications at the national level (Cowles et al., 2001; Börzel, 2003). In 
this sense, member states are not only recipients of EU calls for domestic change but also actively 
participate in the formation of policies and procedures. An interesting example is Sweden’s 
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chemical policy adopted by the EU’s European (REACH) Regulation (Liefferink and Wurzel, 
2017:960). Denmark and Germany constitute two exceptional cases in terms of influencing EU 
environmental policy (Liefferink and Wurzel, 2017:956).2 By contrast, this relationship can also 
be more ‘top-down’ (i.e. how member states react to policies coming from the European 
Commission). From a ‘top-down’ perspective, the ‘downloading’ of a policy stemming from the 
EU can find the policy recipients (member states) facing implementation difficulties and 
compliance issues due to public pressure, structural inefficiencies, administrative incapacity and 
high adaptation costs (Börzel, 2002; Jänicke, 2005). The need for domestic change and policy 
adaptation includes different types of pressure at the domestic and EU level (Radaelli, 2003). The 
rationale of the ‘top-down’ approach is used in this paper to explain the actions of member states 
in ‘downloading’ (implementing) policies. Consequently, policy compliance is also intertwined 
with implementation costs which domestic actors may (or not) be willing to take on (Holzinger 
and Knill, 2008). This issue, however, may create additional problems for national governments 
regarding the costs of EU policies imposed on them in times of economic crisis.  
As we are interested in implementation deficits in the form of policy outcomes, we adapt the ‘top-
down’ perspective to frame our analysis.  From a ‘top-down’ perspective, the impact of EU policy 
is often construed in the context of ‘the goodness of fit’ and the intervening factors that differ 
across policies and member states (Börzel and Risse, 2003; Mastenbroek and Van Keulen, 2006; 
Bulmer, 2008; Mendez et al., 2008). The ‘goodness of fit’ between the national and EU level 
defines the extent of pressure for adaptation caused by Europeanization on member states (Cowles 
et al., 2001). More specifically, the high degree of pressure for adaptation can be reliant on how 
compatible EU-level policy is with the existing domestic administrative procedures, structures, 
and policies. According to the concept there are two kinds of ‘misfit’ or ‘mismatch’ that may 
manifest. The first is policy ‘misfit’ caused by divergence in EU and domestic policy frameworks. 
The second is institutional ‘misfit’ - when the institutional implications of EU policy diverge from 
and contradict established domestic institutional norms. If domestic and EU principles cannot be 
met, there is a likely imposition of costly domestic adaptation measures which can result in 
administrative difficulties and thus weaker implementation.  
 
The concepts of ‘policy misfits’ and ‘goodness of fit’ are not without its critics. Among other 
things, they have been criticized for being too nebulous and thus open to various interpretations 
for not fully accounting for the other endogenous and exogenous pressures beyond the European 
Union (Haverland 2000; Mastenbroek and Keading 2006; Sotiropoulos 2015). Following their 
application in studies of Europeanisation in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the concepts tended to 
fall out of favour only to experience a renaissance in recent years (e.g. Domaradzki, 2019; 
Leventon, 2015; Saurugger, 2014; Sotiropoulos, 2015) especially in relation to the impact of the 
2008 economic crisis (e.g. Saurugger 2014; Sotiropoulos 2015). These more recent studies have 
 
2 The former as a small country which exercised leadership in certain stages of EU policy making, the latter as a larger 
state that provided leadership throughout all decision-making stages. Both of them introduced environmental policy 
innovations and exhibited high levels of ambitions and standards in different timings. In addition to this, another 
factor is the six-month rotating Council Presidency that permits Member states to hold the grip and wield great 
influence to the EU (Liefferink and Wurzel, 2017:956). 
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attempted to apply the concepts in a more nuanced way to reflect the aforementioned criticisms in 
order to understand the contexts in which the ‘goodness of fit’ hypothesis applies to different 
Europeanisation frameworks and those in which it does not. In this paper we seek to follow this 
approach under the expectation that in some instances the economic crisis of 2008 has been a major 
driver on the ‘leader-laggard’ dynamic in the European Union. 
 
3. Research Design and Methodology 
This research draws on data from descriptive statistics in the form of environmental infringements3 
- as recorded in official European Commission and European Court of Justice documents4 - and 
semi-structured interviews with elite state and non-state actors, such as policy officials and 
stakeholders from September 2014 to March 2015. The cut-off point of March 2015 represents a 
period well after the advent of the economic crisis and is a point where the European economy was 
generally seen to be recovering (EC: DG for Economic and Financial Affairs, Spring 2015). The 
main interview data we draw on comes from 7 interviewees working at the EU level. Another 
strand of the wider research project also involved the case studies of Greece (10 interviews) and 
the UK (9 interviews) whose economies experienced austerity and significant domestic political, 
economic and administrative pressures to overlook environmental policy implementation in the 
name of growth. While this member state perspective is limited to two, drawing on this data allows 
us to support the broader findings from the EU interviewees to gain deeper insights from the 
perspective of a purported ‘leader’ or ‘in-betweener’ (UK) and a ‘laggard’ (Greece), who were 
both significantly but differently impacted by austerity politics. Participants from the EU and 
member states were selected based on the relevance of their position and workplace. A few 
examples include the European Commission, its affiliated agencies and research centers, 
government and local authorities, academia, international organizations, NGOs, and the business 
world (see the list of interviewees in Appendix). All interviewees were anonymized upon request 
and presented in a code (as EU1, UK1 and GR1…etc.) to indicate their origin. Data on 
infringements was tabulated and graphically illustrated using data compiled from the official 
European Commission data sets such as Annual Reports (26th – 32nd) on Monitoring the 
Application of EU law and analyses of DG Environment from 2008 until 2014. These reports 




3 Environmental infringements relate to the violation of Community environmental law. The EU Commission may 
take legal action and initiate a formal infringement procedure (of several stages each ending with a formal decision 
as laid out in the EU treaties) if an EU country fails to transpose the provisions of directives and implement EU law. 
Similarly, it may refer the issue to the Court of Justice which in some cases (of persistent non-compliance) results in 
the imposition of financial penalties. A telling example is the referral of Greece by the Commission to the European 
Court of Justice over poor waste water treatment presenting a risk to public health (26/02/2015) (IP/15/4491). 
4 For more information please see the Annual Reports of the European Commission on monitoring the application 





4. Empirical Data 
4.1. Broad EU Implementation Trends 
This section seeks to capture the broad implementation output trends. As figure 4.1.1. shows 
below, the number of environmental infringements at the EU level appears to have steadily 
declined from 2008 to 2012. Interestingly, the economic crisis does not seem to have had a 
significant impact. More explicitly, two phases are evident. The first phase (2008-2010) constitutes 
the clear peak in the number of environmental infringements compared to the second phase (2011-
2014), which shows a slight increase between 2012 and 2013 and a minor drop in 2014. In this 
respect, an interviewee (EU2) epitomized the views of the majority of the respondents stating that 
"we have come a long way in terms of effectiveness. It is significantly better than it was". However, 
this does not allow complacency considering the words of another interviewee (EU5) that “there 
are persistent problems with enforcement and implementation that have not been solved efficiently 
and continue to be a significant barrier”. For the interviewee (EU6), this drop may be due to the 
threat of fines by the ECJ. However, what seems to have changed for some UK respondents 
(UK6,8-9) is possibly the stance of some member states towards the infringement procedure by 
being more cost-conscious. Arguably, the pressure exerted on member states according to the 
participants (GR8,10) and (UK8,9) to comply in times of financial distress and high public deficits 
is even stronger as it entails additional costs in relation to paying fines, which would deprive the 
state of necessary financial resources that otherwise could be shifted elsewhere (i.e. to underpin 
other policy areas at the national level). Similarly, other factors such as the contribution of the 
Pilot Scheme5 may have played a significant role in resolving disputes and thus a reduction in the 
number of cases that proceed to the court. For others, such as (EU3), this decrease reflects good 
collaboration and coordination of the member states and on-going monitoring from the European 
Commission. From a slightly different perspective, another interviewee (EU6) attributes this 
improvement to the long-term planning and the committed environmental ambitions of some of 
the member states. He exemplified Germany as one of those countries that changed its growth 
model to a more sustainable path – although as noted above some commentators have expressed a 
back sliding from Germany on its environment commitments (Liefferink and Wurzel, 2017). 
Supporting this overall viewpoint, the argument of the interviewee (EU1) is well-grounded that 
the global environmental challenges such as climate change find member states pressed to abide 





5 The Pilot Scheme was gradually introduced from 2008 to 2012 as an informal mechanism to dispute settling by 





Figure 4.1.1.: Environmental infringements by member states by year, 2008-2014  
 
Source: Authors’ Compiled data sets using official European Commission data from the Annual Reports on 
Monitoring the Application of EU law (DG Environment) (http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/law/statistics.htm)  
As argued by many respondents a major economic factor is that the pattern observed above may 
simply be a reflection of a lower economic output following the 2008 economic crisis. For 
example, the decrease of industrial production, investments and spending power of citizens may 
have triggered fewer environmental ‘spillovers’ or externalities. However, an interviewee (UK2) 
expressed some concerns about this: “I think my guess is that over the next few years it's going to 
be increasingly challenging for public authorities to continue to implement environmental 
legislation at the level that was intended and apparently this is because of a steady reduction in 
the availability of public expenditure for enforcement activities”. Additionally, the interviewees 
(EU1,7 and UK3) contended that the absence of EU environmental inspectorates greatly weakens 
the capacity to monitor and control the implementation process and outcomes; “there are no 
environmental inspectors in the EU. We have fisheries inspectors; we have public inspectors but 
we don't have environmental inspectors. So, we don't have the power to go on the ground”, (EU1).   
 
4.2. Implementation at the member state level 





















Country Year Total Average  





Austria 11 13 9 6 10 16 12 77 11 
Belgium 21 20 18 13 9 10 23 114 16.28 
 
Bulgaria 7 17 17 17 14 17 15 97 14.85 
 
Cyprus 9 7 11 11 7 14 0 59 8.42 
 
Croatia N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1 9 10 5 
 
The Czech Republic 18 26 17 21 5 7 9 103 14.71 
 
Denmark 17 13 8 7 6 8 4 63 9 
 
Estonia 19 10 11 3 6 9 2 60 8.57 
 
Finland 12 6 13 6 8 14 6 65 9.28 
 
France 34 26 19 15 14 19 19 146 20.85 
 
Germany 9 8 12 7 9 12 13 70 10 
 
Greece 27 24 33 25 22 25 36 192 27.42 
 
Hungary 12 11 9 10 8 7 4 61 8.71 
 
Ireland 35 34 25 17 11 8 7 137 19.57 
 
Italy 45 35 46 40 25 25 18 234 33.42 
 
Latvia 12 6 7 5 6 5 6 47 6.71 
 
Lithuania 14 11 9 5 1 3 1 44 11 
 
Luxembourg 16 8 10 8 3 5 2 52 7.42 
 
Malta 12 12 10 6 6 5 5 56 8 
 
The Netherlands 7 5 4 2 2 4 2 26 3.71 
 
Poland 16 23 26 21 19 20 20 145 20.71 
 
Portugal 21 23 26 24 17 13 10 134 19.14 
 
Romania 7 12 17 8 10 13 30 97 13.85 
 




Source: Authors’ Compiled data sets using official European Commission data from the Annual Reports on 
Monitoring the Application of EU law (DG Environment) (http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/law/statistics.htm)  
The annual distribution of environmental infringements per member state is summed up in Table 
4.2.1. The overall trend shown here is an improving or flatling implementation trend for the 
majority of the 28 Member states which reflects the EU picture in the previous section. Notably, 
this is very obvious in some cases such as of Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Hungary, Italy, Ireland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal and the United Kingdom. In 
contrast, countries such as Greece and Romania seem to deviate from this trend with an acute rise 
in infringements, particularly in 2014.  
How do these findings compare to accounts in the existing literature outlined above (Liefferink 
and Wurzel, 2017; Tobin, 2017) in terms of the classification of 'leaders', 'laggards' and 'in-
betweeners'? In relation to the data in the table, being a ‘leader’ or ‘laggard’ is associated with the 
total (low or high) number of environmental infringements from 2008 to 2014 which are mirrored 
overall in the average of each state over this period. In line with the majority of previous studies, 
our data suggest that Austria, Denmark, Germany, Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden can still 
be considered as relative ‘leaders’. For some interviewees (e.g. EU2,3, GR7-10, UK5,6), Northern 
European states remain on top of the ranking due to strong administrative capacity with the 
establishment of sophisticated organizations such as environment agencies to deal exclusively with 
the implementation of these policies. When establishing ‘laggards’ our data suggest that only 
Greece and Spain appear to be aligned with the majority of the literature. Both Greece and Spain 
exhibit a declining pattern of implementation since the 2008 crisis as shown by the increasing 
number of infringements. Moreover, the record of Ireland and Portugal, both of which, in contrast 
to the existing literature seem to show an implementation pattern more akin to a ‘leader’ than a 
‘laggard’. According to five out of seven EU respondents, a possible reason could be that a lower 
economic output in these countries led to fewer environmental externalities. However, the main 
critique of this view is that Greece had an even lower economic output for the same time period 
while its implementation record was significantly weaker than that of Ireland and Portugal. 
Therefore, it is debatable how the decline of economic performance may lead to a better 
implementation. It may be that the precise impact of the credit crunch was dependent on the 
individual economic, environmental and administrative contexts of the different member states, 
but our data is not conclusive on this. Alternatively, fiscal consolidation and the risk of fines may 
have acted for some respondents such as UK6-7 and GR5-7 as a stimulus to correct these 
implementation failures as they require more prudent and sound management of public economics. 
Slovenia 8 6 10 7 11 18 12 72 10.28 
 
Spain 37 40 33 27 32 29 30 228 32.57 
 




31 26 18 11 13 18 16 133 19 
 




It may be supported that depriving the economy of significant financial resources to pay fines in 
this critical juncture can be considered a compliance incentive, as suggested by some of our 
interviewees (EU4,6 and UK8-9). 
The Baltic countries display a very good record. According to one interviewee (EU1), the record 
of the Baltic countries could be explained in the context of sharing the same environmental 
tradition and culture as the Scandinavian countries which makes them quite efficient when 
problems arise. “From the moment, there is a problem they will try to resolve it, they don't ask for 
time, they don't necessarily wait for judgment, and they are willing to more or less accept the 
expertise of the Commission for what they think is suitable”. However, it is worth noting the 
apparent variations among the ex-communist states from Central-Eastern Europe. Based on the 
interviewees (EU4) and (EU6) their mixed performance could be linked to less strict domestic 
environmental standards following the accession to the EU in 2004, the wider socio-economic 
problems such as unemployment and the need for economic growth. Finally, fewer variations are 
identified among the ‘in-betweeners’. Excluding Luxembourg, the rest seem to be largely 
concomitant with the literature. Overall, our data show that especially traditional ‘leaders’ appear 
to be relatively stable in their environmental policy implementation record. The ‘leader-laggard’ 
dynamic shows less stability overtime when it comes to identifying ‘laggards’ as demonstrated by 
the markedly better implementation record of some of the traditionally weaker and/or newer 
member states when compared to previous assessments in the literature. 
 
 
5. Implementation and the ‘Goodness of Fit’  
In many respects we find that, overall, with the improving patterns of environmental policy 
implementation observed in this research, policy and institutional ‘misfits’ may not be so 
problematic. This may be in part due to the relatively maturity of the environmental policy in the 
EU and the strong prominence that the EU places on high environmental standards, which as our 
interviewees have argued, have led to concerted efforts by the European Commission and member 
states to coordinate their policy actions reducing the risk of ‘misfit’. That being said, our country 
by country analysis does suggest that EU member states have been affected since the 2008 
economic crisis in different ways. So how does the policy ‘misfit’ approach fit with our analysis? 
To answer this question, we draw on both our EU level interviews and our interviewees from 
Greece and the UK- representing a member state whose implementation record has plateaued and 
a member state whose implementation record improved respectively - to get a more in-depth 
insight. 
Crucially, the overriding ‘misfit’ seems to manifest between environmental policy goals and 
broader macroeconomic policy, which makes the environment less attractive in the eyes of 
politicians and the public. Notably, this ‘misfit’ departs from the original Europeanisation 
hypothesis which deals with the existing national structures and the ‘fit’ with EU initiatives. But 
the ‘misfit’ observed here is the result of change from the policy status quo in some member states 
due to pressures from the economic crisis and resulting austerity.  This ‘misfit’ nicely characterized 
by interviewees (EU6) and (GR6-10) who argued, for instance, that the strong impact of the 
economic crisis on Greece has increased the pressure on politicians to tackle the issues of rising 
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unemployment and the rapid deterioration in living standards. Inevitably, the mounting public 
pressure in conjunction with strong economic voices seems to have effectively dislodged the 
environmental discourse from the policy agenda, thus making it a secondary issue. This effect has 
immeasurably overshadowed the implementation of environmental legislation. Consequently, the 
views of interviewees (UK4), (GR2,4) that environmental policy is under pressure from other 
higher political objectives, such as economic growth, fits with this line of argument. This is to say 
that the task of securing public enthusiasm not only for new environmental initiatives but also for 
the implementation of the existing environmental measures at the national level becomes more 
difficult in the face of cuts to administrative budgets and public services. Our interviews indicate 
that this is the case for both ‘leaders’ and ‘laggards’ with EU interviewees and respondents in the 
UK and Greece pointing to such pressures. As an interviewee (EU3) mentioned, “I suspect if 
you've got a period of inequality which is increasing, then there is probably a lot of sense in saying 
that, at the same time, the environment would probably suffer or it won't be looked after as well 
as it could be because resources, capital, and funds are going to areas where people and capital 
are already there, so it's becoming more concentrated”.  
In a similar vein, our findings further show that institutional ‘misfit’ is impacting upon 
environmental policy implementation of some member states due to austerity policies reducing the 
size of government and thus hollowing out the capacity to implement policy and monitor 
compliance, especially those states in Southern Europe which have been hardest hit by fiscal 
problems (see also Burns and Tobin, 2016). Interviewees reported that the direct effects of the 
economic crisis are mostly seen in the reduction of staff and available economic resources to 
member states to implement, hence lowering the institutional capacity and inducing ‘misfits’ not 
just amongst the ‘laggards’ but also the ‘in-betweeners’. Again, this situation would represent a 
departure from the original conceptions of institutional ‘misfits’ that deal with existing member 
state institutional capacity rather than an exogenous institutional change which compounds or 
leads to ‘misfits’ as we see in our data.  
However, such a reading does not reflect all of the trends we observed above, as in general terms 
we see an improvement in implementation record in the data in the period after the economic crisis. 
Moreover, we see a varied implementation pattern between states with similar backgrounds (e.g. 
in Southern Europe). So other endogenous and exogenous must be at play beyond simply 
considering policy and institutional ‘misfits’. There were the aforementioned suggestions by all of 
the EU level interviewees that ‘misfits’ may be present in different domestic policy frameworks 
with lower standards than those enshrined in EU policy which may be more problematic in some 
member states (e.g. Greece). Variation in implementation patterns between similar member states 
(e.g. Eastern or Southern Europe) could therefore depend on aspects such as the level of 
industrialization. Indeed, socio-economic factors were cited by a few UK interviewees (UK4,7-9), 
for instance in the context of the level of industrialization, urbanization, and density of population. 
In such cases, in the advent of economic crisis we might find countries with a strong reliance on 
heavy industry and manufacturing experience displaying stronger implementation patterns relative 
to their ‘leader’ or ‘laggard’ peers because of reduced economic output leading to fewer 
environmental externalities (e.g. Poland). Some of our findings also advocate that the policy 
approaches of neighboring countries can also be an important factor as in the case with an observed 
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stronger pattern of compliance in Baltic member states which have strong ties with their 
Scandinavian neighbors known as traditional environmental policy ‘leaders’. The performance of 
neighbours can also weaken implementation with for instance, the indifferent implementation 
record of the new member states from Central Europe as well as some Mediterranean states.  
While not a consideration in the ‘misfit’ literature, which is more focused on institutional and 
policy analysis, our interview data (particularly that stemming from EU level interviewees) 
indicate the possibility of ‘misfit’ between the policy and the geographical area in which it must 
be implemented. This is especially an issue with the environmental policy where local 
environmental conditions can be crucial to the success or not of a policy. Take for example water 
policy, where land cover and geomorphology can have vastly different implications for run-off 
and water quality, meaning that more uniform policy approaches may not be appropriate. 
Similarly, the amount of natural resources a country has to manage raises important questions 
about costs where nine out of ten Greek interviewees emphasized the high cost for countries with 
a large coastline to be fully compliant with the Bathing Water Directive.  
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we analyzed the impact of the economic crisis on the implementation of EU 
environmental policy and the ‘leader-laggard’ dynamic in member states with the use of ‘the 
goodness of fit’ approach. Crucially, our data demonstrate that the implementation of EU 
environmental policy has generally seen an improving record since the economic crisis in 2008 as 
reflected in the lower number of environmental infringements at the EU Member state level. Thus, 
it may be argued that the economic crisis has not had a negative impact on the capacity of states 
to implement as might have anticipated. A key finding is that the decline in environmental 
infringements may be associated with a lower economic output that resulted in fewer 
environmental externalities thus affecting the overall implementation performance. Another point 
is the fluidity of the ‘leader-laggard’ dynamic as highlighted by the noticeable variations in 
performance among the traditional poor implementers. Indeed, ‘leaders’ continue to outperform 
‘laggards’ but two traditional 'laggards' (Ireland and Portugal) appear to cast off that 
characterization. With regards to the ‘goodness of fit’ approach, our analysis shows that 
institutional and policy ‘misfits’ may be less important given the generally improved pattern of 
implementation. That being said, our data show that in some instances, institutional and policy 
misfits are still significant – more in southern member states like Greece and less so in more 
northern member states such as the UK- with the economic crisis possibly creating new ‘misfits’ 
in subtle ways which are not easy to pinpoint or isolate on a country by country basis. However, 
this finding departs from the original conceptualization of ‘goodness of fit’ in Europeanisation 
studies which suggest that policy ‘misfits’ occur where the existing EU member state institutions 
do not fit with European policy requirements. Instead, we observe that the economic crisis in some 
instances results in changes at the member state level that led to or exacerbated ‘misfits’ 
contributing to the changing dynamics of the ‘leader-laggard’ dynamic. Moreover, our research 
points to a number of factors that impact upon member states’ relationship with EU environmental 
policy beyond the policy ‘(mis)fit’ hypothesis which warrant further investigation, such as the 
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influence of neighbouring states and the role of geography. We acknowledge that the recovery of 
EU economy in tandem with more empirical research and a wider set of interviews amongst 
member states would help contextualize these factors and their interaction with ‘misfits’ to better 
understand whether they will be a problematic barrier for the member states to meet EU’s 
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